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LECTURE
CHOCOLATE, COPYRIGHT, CONFUSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
David Vaver*

This lecture scans how the Supreme Court has been interpreting Canada’s
intellectual property laws and how its decisions may affect legislative policy.
The Court has become more interested and competent in this field than was
the case even a couple of decades ago. The approach in two decisions of the
Court, Compo Co. Ltd v. Blue Crest Music Inc. (1979) and Euro-Excellence
Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc. (2007) is particularly compared. Compo contains
propositions which unintendedly cast a baneful influence over later law,
while Kraft sees the Court split four ways in a case where copyright law was
used unsuccessfully to attempt to block parallel imports of chocolate bars
into Canada. The lecture concludes that such decisions, among others,
expose how inadequately successive governments have monitored
intellectual property law developments. It calls for an independent
commission to develop a more coherent intellectual property code that will
advance Canadian economic interests and be readily understood by its users.

Professor Emeritus of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law,
University of Oxford. This paper is a revised version of the James L. Lewtas Lecture
delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School on October 24, 2007. A webcast is archived at
mms://media.osgoode.yorku.ca/events/LewtasLecture-Oct242007.wmv. A version in
French is in progress for publication.
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The brief for this lecture was “to stimulate fresh thinking in
Osgoode Hall Law School and the University, legal and general
communities about legal and public policy related to business and
economic activity.” In the intellectual property field, there is so much
thinking now around that one hesitates to warrant that what one
proffers is “fresh”. Ecclesiastes (1:9) is no help in laying down that
“What has been will be again; what has been done will be done again;
there is nothing new under the sun.”
Fortunately, intellectual property lawyers treat that verse,
despite its high authority, as obiter dicta. Copyright law calls
anything “fresh” that is not copied and that involves a bit of skill or
judgment. What’s more, it protects that compositional speck from
being copied pretty well worldwide for the lifetime of the author and
another fifty (and in some places—Europe, the United States,
Australia—even seventy) years. The level of freshness required is
indicated by the Supreme Court’s decision three years ago that
headnotes and catchlines to law reports are original.1 My talk is
longer than a catchline, perhaps even longer than some Supreme
Court headnotes. I have a few old ideas to recycle but I promise to
give them new clothes so they look fresh. Copyright law is, after all,
about looks, not substance. In any event, construing my brief
purposively—as is the current interpretative fashion—I believe I need
only stimulate you to think freshly.
Nobody will dispute that intellectual property law is, in terms
of the brief, “related to business and economic activity”; indeed, it is
central to much of it.2 True, there are people who tinker in the
basement, and even in universities, just for the fun of it. Many do so
without knowing or caring about intellectual property law. They
mess about just because they are innately curious about their world,
how it works, and how it might be made to work better. Even that
1

CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R.

339, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 395 [CCH].
A recent statistical study on the Supreme Court lumps “intellectual property” and
“patents” (an interesting subcategorization in itself) in with banking, competition law,
and insurance under the heading of “Corporate” cases: A. Green & B. Alarie, “Policy
Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (Paper
presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, New York
University School of Law 9 November 2007) at 13, online: Social Science Research
Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013560>.
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probably constitutes economic activity, liberally construed. Tinkering
involves opportunity costs, but also creates welfare by keeping
tinkerers from otherwise roaming streets with intent.
There is a minority school of romantic thought which idolizes
authors, artists and the copyright law that protects them as being
outside and beyond commerce. But that view has attracted little
interest among North American materialists; nor would it be
recognized by those whose daily job is to help authors, composers and
artists make a decent living from their endeavours.
What
governments think of intellectual property is conclusively established
by the appearance of whole chapters devoted to intellectual property
in free trade agreements such as NAFTA (1992) and the World Trade
Organization Agreement (1994). Such treaties emphasize that
intellectual property is not just business and economics: it is big
business and global economics.

I
How is the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with intellectual
property cases and what are the implications of its decisions for
Canada’s intellectual property system? Is there some shortfall and, if
so, what can be done about it? These are large questions, and I can
only sketch a response in a lecture such as this. I shall take mainly
two decisions as examples – one from nearly thirty years ago, the
other from mid-2007.
By way of preface, I should note that there is actually no such
single legal entity as Intellectual Property. The phrase is just
convenient shorthand for a whole raft of different rights: some
statutory, some judge-made. Their common thread is that they
protect some products of the human mind, for varying periods of
time, against use by others of those products in various ways.3
There is continuing philosophical debate about why society
grants these rights at all: the shades of Locke, Kant, Adam Smith,
Bentham, Hegel and Marx wander the terrain, together with their
intellectual successors. None provides a single sufficient explanation.
For our purposes, intellectual property rights, as currently configured,
Intellectual property boosters may prefer a more ornate description of the field, but I
leave fairy stories for nurseries.
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are best justified as encouraging those who may wish to create,
finance or exploit products of the mind to translate intent into act,
particularly where they might otherwise not act at all, or act less often
or less well, without the carrot of protection.
The most familiar rights are patents, copyrights, and trademarks, but lots more have been added or developed over time:
industrial design rights, semiconductor topography and plant breeder
rights, common law and delictual rights over trade secrets and
confidential information, and other rights that prevent or redress
various acts of unfair competition (such as passing-off). Patent law
protects new and non-obvious inventions; copyright protects creative
work from being copied; trade-mark law protects trade-marks from
confusion and other objectionable practices. The rights are largely
territorial but are fairly standardized worldwide as a result of
intellectual property treaties and free trade agreements.
Twenty, even ten, years ago, a topic on the Supreme Court
and intellectual property would have produced a pretty thin lecture.
Till then in the post-World War II period, the Supreme Court of
Canada continued doing mostly other things than intellectual
property. It regarded intellectual property as arcana best left to the
experts. The cases that came to it involved mainly pharmaceutical
patents, the now defunct compulsory patent licensing scheme,
copyright in music, records or broadcasting, the odd case on industrial
design, trade-mark passing-off or procedure, or even on constitutional
law (e.g., Could the Parliament create a tort of unfair competition?
Answer: no; unfair competition might be trade and commerce, but
just enacting a tort was not “regulation” of it).4 The Court seemed
most comfortable when handling the common law cases.
It
generalized and discussed policy according to the fashion of the time
and the judges’ individual inclinations, much as it did in other cases of
tort. As soon as the Court ventured into the statutory intellectual
property rights, one immediately sensed its awkwardness, its wish to
stay close to the statutory language, find a handy precedent from
England or an earlier Canadian case, and, after reciting the facts and
the lower courts’ disposition of the case, say just the bare minimum

MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1, Laskin C.J.C
for the majority, concurring judgment by de Grandpré J [MacDonald].
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necessary to get by.5 What sparks there were came from the federal
and provincial trial courts and courts of appeal.6
There were of course exceptions. Pigeon J. seemed actually to
enjoy his forays into patent law,7 although his pronouncements on
trade-marks and copyright could be somewhat delphic.8 Judson J.
wrote some workmanlike opinions across the board,9 as did Martland
See e.g., Cuisenaire v. South West Imports Ltd, [1969] S.C.R. 208, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 430,
Ritchie J. for the Court (no copyright in mathematics teaching rods); Webb & Knapp
(Can.) Ltd, v. Edmonton (City), [1970] S.C.R. 588, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 544, Hall J. for
majority, Abbott J. for the dissenters [Webb & Knapp] (awarding damages for
copyright infringement of architectural plans).

5

See e.g., Hay v. Sloan (1957), 12 D.L.R.(2d) 397 (Ont. H.C.), where a refreshing
opinion by Stewart J, ranging from Vitruvius and Palladio through to Mondrian and
Gertrude Stein, determined that a simple house qualified for copyright as an original
“architectural work of art”. The following sample typifies the whole:

6

“Suppose a man were to build himself a pig-pen garnished with fretted gingerbread
and with four lovely turrets, yet firm and commodious. Let it stand in its
multicoloured horror a mid-Victorian blot upon the landscape. Let us assume that no
contemporary could accept this edifice as anything but an architectural excrescence
of the most loathsome kind, yet to its creator it could well be a thing of beauty and to
its inhabitants a porcine paradise. An attempt has been made to produce venustas and
some originality displayed. This, in my view, is sufficient to render such building the
subject-matter of copyright.”
See e.g., Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1974] S.C.R.
111, 8 C.P.R. (2d) 202 (medical invention); Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v. HewlettPackard (Can.) Ltd (1974), 17 C.P.R.(2d) 97 (reissue and claim construction);
Monsanto Co. v. Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1108, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 385,
Pigeon J. for majority (allowable extent of claim and Commissioner’s duties);
Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Halocarbon (Ont.) Ltd [1979] 2 S.C.R. 929, 104 D.L.R.(3d)
51, Pigeon J. for majority (novelty and non-obviousness).
7

CAPAC v. CTV Television Network Ltd, [1968] S.C.R. 676, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 98
(transmitting music over network was communicating not the “work” but merely a
“performance” of it); Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Ltée, [1970] S.C.R. 942 , 16
D.L.R. (3d) 740 (restricting, without statutory authority, trade-mark registration to
single province); S.C. Johnson & Son Ltd. v. Marketing International Ltd., [1980] 1
S.C.R. 99, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 423 (“Off!” trade-mark for insect repellent unregistrable as
clearly descriptive because elliptical).
8

9 Circle Film Enterprises Inc. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1959] S.C.R. 602, 20
D.L.R. (2d) 211 (effect of copyright registration) [Circle Film]; Commissioner of
Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst AG [1964] S.C.R. 49, 41 C.P.R. 9 (double patenting);
Cheerio Toys & Games Ltd v. Dubiner, [1966] S.C.R. 206, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 313
(dissenting from Hall J.’s majority view that assignors cannot challenge an assigned
trade-mark’s validity); Netupsky v. Dominion Bridge Co. Ltd, [1972] S.C.R. 368, 24
D.L.R. (3d) 484 (engineer’s control over building alterations).
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J. on patents10 and Laskin C.J.C. on trade marks and names,11 and other
judges produced the thoughtful occasional contribution. Thus,
Dickson J., although on unfamiliar territory, seemed to relish the
intellectual challenge of getting to grips with the esoteric question of
how comprehensible a patent specification had to be to pass muster as
valid (less comprehensible to lay folk than the lower court had
claimed, he finally decided for the Court).12 And the present Chief
Justice, foreshadowing her tour de force for the Court in CCH13 a
decade later, ventured forth extrajudicially on the general need for a
balanced approach to intellectual property issues.14
But the rest of the Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence
before the early 1990s made mostly for pretty grim reading. Even
Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Commissioner of Patents (1966), 33 Fox P.C. 99, 50
C.P.R. 220 (reissue); S. & S. Industries Inc. v. Rowell, [1966] S.C.R. 419, 56 D.L.R.
(2d) 501 (patent threats; Spence J. concurring); Formea Chemicals Ltd v. Polymer
Corp. Ltd, [1968] S.C.R. 754, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 114 (Crown use); Armstrong Cork Canada
v. Domco Industries Ltd, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 907, 156 D.L.R. (3d) 595 (non-exclusive
patent licensee may claim infringement damages).
10

La Maur Inc. v. Prodon Industries Ltd [1971] S.C.R. 973, 20 D.L.R.(3d) 10
(confusion); Canadian Motorways Ltd v. Laidlaw Motorways Ltd [1974] S.C.R. 675, 40
D.L.R.(3d) 52 (Laskin J. for majority (Pigeon J. concurring, Judson and Ritchie JJ.
dissenting), upholding administrative decision requiring change of confusing
corporate name); Chateau-Gai Wines Ltd v. Institut National des Appellations
d’Origine des Vins et Eaux-de-Vie, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 190, 51 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (Laskin J.
for 4:5 minority, arguing against protection of “champagne” under Canada- France
trade treaty); MacDonald, supra note 4 (constitutionality of provisions in Trade-mark
Act); Breck’s Sporting Goods Co. Ltd v. Magder, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 527, 63 D.L.R.(3d)
645 [Breck’s] (assignment of manufacturer’s mark to exclusive distributor invalidated
registration; parallel imports allowed).
11

Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504, 122 D.L.R.
(3d) 203 [Consolboard]. See also: General Motors Corp. v. Bellows, [1949] S.C.R. 678,
10 C.P.R. 101, Rand J. (on trade-mark validity and infringement); Pioneer Hi-Bred
Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 223, Lamer J.
(disclosure requirement for genetically modified plant not fulfilled); R. v. Stewart,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 1, Lamer J. (copyright and confidential information
not property under Criminal Code) [Stewart]; Shell Oil Co. v. Commissioner of
Patents, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, 67 C.P.R. (2d) 1, Wilson J. (new use for old compound
patentable).

12

13

CCH, supra note 1.

14

B. McLachlin, “Intellectual Property – What's it all About?”, in G. Henderson ed.,

Trade Marks Law of Canada (Carswell, 1993); cf. Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
467, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 97, McLachlin J. (affirming synchronization right in copyright and
rejecting implied ephemeral recording exception for broadcasters).
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Emmett Hall’s passion for health care seemed to desert him when he
wrote for the Court on intellectual property cases involving
medicines. Hall J. clearly realized the stakes when pharmaceutical
companies tried to stop generic drug makers from replicating the
shape and colour of pills that came off patent, or from formulating
samples before applying for a licence or marketing authority prior to
selling pills in quantity, or from enforcing overbroad claims on
medicinal compounds. Hall J. found, fairly enough, against the
intellectual property holder and for the generic company in such
cases. Yet his opinions were stilted and dry, little beyond an ex
cathedra application of a prior English or Canadian precedent
supporting his view, and the case then disposed of in a paragraph or
two. There was little, if any, reference to the case’s social or economic
implications, or even to the competing arguments or case law.15
These comments on the style of the Court’s intellectual
property opinions may typify much of the Court’s writing generally in
pre-Bill of Rights and pre-Charter days. Nevertheless, a clear
additional reason for the judges’ reticence is evident: their relative
unfamiliarity with intellectual property law, which they readily
admitted to, if asked. Few seemed interested in making the effort
required to familiarize themselves more. When they did dip their toe,
one felt they really should have gone for full immersion. Even the
great could bellyflop when they stepped off well beaten paths of
precedent into the slurry of intellectual property theory and minutiae.
1979.16

Take Compo Co. Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music Inc. decided in
Estey J. wrote for a unanimous Court on the question of

Parke, Davis & Co. v. Empire Laboratories Ltd, [1964] S.C.R. 351, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 97
(trade-marks for pills); Hoechst Pharmaceuticals of Canada Ltd v. Gilbert & Co.,
[1966] S.C.R. 189, 32 Fox P.C. 56; and Société des usines chimiques Rhone-Poulenc v.
Jules R. Gilbert Ltd (1968), 69 D.L.R.(3d) 353, 12 O.R. (2nd) 465 (overclaiming); Micro
Chemicals Ltd v. Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corp., [1972] S.C.R. 506, 25
D.L.R. (3d) 99 (research exemption for patents). Similarly in non-medical cases: see
Hall J’s opinions in Rodi & Wienenberger AG v. Metalliflex Ltd, [1966] S.C.R. 593 , 33
Fox P.C. 87 (compulsory licensing); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., [1967] S.C.R. 664, 36 Fox P.C. 166 (obviousness); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.
v. Ford Motor Co., [1970] S.C.R. 833, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 210 (pre-existing use defence to
patent infringement claim). For a terse opinion for the Court in a passing-off case, see
Tartan Breweries Ltd v. Carling Breweries (B.C.) Ltd (1969), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 773, 44
Fox P.C. 6.
15

16

[1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 249 [Campo].
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whether or not a company that pressed sound recordings needed
copyright clearance from the copyright owner of the music, in
addition to any clearance the record company that commissioned the
presser may have needed. Estey J. examined the Copyright Act, found
no relevant Canadian or British authorities on point, analyzed some
comparable US authorities, and came to the plausible conclusion that
the presser did indeed need clearance or it would be liable for
infringement. In the course of a lengthy judgment, Estey J. said,
sensibly:
“Courts in this technical field of copyright have found it
prudent to make their judicial answers congruent with the
legal issues raised in the proceeding at hand leaving, so far
as possible, analogies, examples and hypothetical questions
to another day.”17

Unfortunately, he then proceeded to ignore his own advice,
with repercussions for theoreticians and practitioners alike. Take two
issues that have proved troublesome since: one narrow, the other
broader.
First, having correctly said that the record presser got no
copyright in a record simply by pressing it, Estey J. then went on:
“The fact that [the presser] did not and could not obtain
copyright in the record is in no way determinative of the
question, ‘Has [the presser] infringed the rights of the
[copyright owner]?’ No unauthorized exercise of the
owner’s mechanical rights in a work can produce in the
wrongdoer a copyright in the resultant record.”18

Now this last sentence is obiter because Estey J. had accepted
that copyright in the record was owned by the record company. The
presser was just doing the donkey work the company had
commissioned it to do, stamping out discs from the master recording.
Yet the Estey dictum is sometimes taken in Canada as good law for
the proposition that a work that infringes another’s copyright cannot
17

Ibid. at 372.

18

Ibid. at 374-75.
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itself get copyright. That may be US law because of a unique
provision in the US Copyright Act that gives the copyright owner
rights over derivative works such as records of copyright music,
whether made with his consent or not.19 But it is not good law
anywhere else in the Commonwealth outside Canada; nor should it be
in Canada.20
A moment’s thought demonstrates why. Suppose a translator
spends months or years translating something in the reasonable belief
that she has the copyright owner’s authority to do so. She turns out to
be wrong—a surprisingly easy thing to do for either a professional or
an amateur.21 Prima facie, the Copyright Act provides that she is, as
author, the copyright owner of an original work. The Act also makes
her an infringer of copyright in the source work, since the right to
translate is part of copyright and honest intent does not excuse
infringement. There is no contradiction between being an author and
infringing another’s rights. The source owner can stop the translator
from exploiting her translation. The translator can stop everyone,
including the source owner, from copying her work. They can
negotiate a deal if the source owner does want to stop her. If he does
not so want, why should third parties be able to copy her work for
nothing? All those propositions fit with the language and purpose of
the Canadian Copyright Act,22 the treaties it implements, general
principles of ownership, and our intuitive feelings of right, wrong,
and proportion. They certainly work better than a result that would,
17 U.S.C. s. 101; Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co. Inc., 290 F. 3d 548
(3d Cir. 2002).

19

See e.g. Ludlow Music Inc. v. Williams, [2002] F.S.R. 868 at 885-86 (Ch.); A-One
Accessory Imports Pty Ltd v. Off Road Imports Pty Ltd (1996), 34 I.P.R. 306 (Aust.
20

Fed. Ct.). See also D. Vaver, “Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus” (1994)
16 E.I.P.R. 159; D. Vaver, “Abridgments and Abstracts: Copyright Implications”
(1995) 17 E.I.P.R. 225.
Although there is a copyright registry in Canada, registration is optional and few
titles are registered; anyway, they are only presumptively, not conclusively, right.
Finding title may require examining a long chain of documents, some in foreign
languages, without knowing if there is a document missing. Professionals such as
CBC lawyers can get it wrong (Circle Films, supra note 9), so what hope is there for
amateurs?
21

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 2 [Copyright Act] (“every original literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic work” includes “translations”), s. 13(1) (author is
owner), s. 27(1) (infringement) & s. 34(1) (remedies), and s. 3(1)(a) (right to translate).

22
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on Estey J.’s dictum, punitively deprive the translator of all benefit
from her work.
The second broader point Estey J. made causes even more
difficulty. It involves how intellectual property law relates to the
general law. Accepting an argument put by counsel, Estey J. said that:
...[C]opyright law is neither tort law nor property law in
classification, but is statutory law. It neither cuts across
existing rights in property or conduct nor falls between
rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common
law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and
obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out
in the statute. ... The legislation speaks for itself and the
actions of the appellant must be measured according to the
terms of the statute.23

That statement is fine as far as it goes: owners and users
should not have powers beyond what Parliament has conferred. But
what if the legislation does not “speak for itself”, as it often does not?
Intellectual property laws are not passed in a vacuum. They are only
partial codes set against the backdrop of the general law. To suggest
the solution to every intellectual property problem can be found
within the four corners of the statute, without recourse to the baggage
of general law the drafters expected readers would bring with them
when looking at the statutes, is disingenuous.
Take, for example, the proposition that copyright law is not
“property law in classification”. This may be a useful reminder not to
apply the rules dealing with tangible property such as cars or
chocolate bars mechanically to copyright or other intellectual
property. But suppose the question is whether a contract, will, or
statute that refers to “property” includes a copyright. Can one just say
“No, it does not, because copyright is not ‘property law in
classification, but is statutory law’”? I think not. The way the
Copyright Act contours the right gives it many of the characteristics
of what we think of as property: rights to exclude third parties, the
power to transfer and license, property-like remedies for

23

Compo, supra note 16, 372-73.
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infringement.24 So copyright or other intellectual property rights are
capable of being characterized as property under a contract, will or
statute.25
The second question is more crucial: is this form of property
meant to be caught by the language of this particular contract, will, or
statute? The first question – is it capable of being so caught? – involves
construing the intellectual property statute. The second – is it in fact
so caught? – involves construing the particular contract, will, or
statute that refers to property. It is perfectly possible to conclude that
intellectual property is property within the meaning of one document,
but not property within the meaning of another. It might not be
property that is capable of being stolen under the Criminal Code, as
the Court convincingly demonstrated in 1988.26 It might very well be
property under a will, where the testator disposes of his land to one
set of beneficiaries and his personal property to another.27 It may or
may not be property under a provincial statute that lets sheriffs seize
personal property for non-payment of a judgment debt; provincial
courts have reached different results in interpreting their execution
statutes, depending on a close reading of the history and purpose of
those Acts.28
So perhaps before the 1990s the judges were wise to stick
closely to what they had to decide and not venture into larger
questions. For when they did, they created problems for both
Other states make the point explicitly: e.g., in the U.K., subs. 1(1) of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides: “Copyright is a property right...”. So do other
UK intellectual property statutes: e.g., s. 30(1) of the Patents Act 1977: “Any patent or
24

application for patent is personal property (without being a thing in action)...”
The phrase in parentheses – “without being a thing in action” – is somewhat mystical:
is there a tertium quid between a chose in possession and a chose in action? The idea
is presumably to oust the operation of the usual provisions on assigning things in
action in s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.) – mirroring provincial
provisions such as s. 36 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253– in favour of
the special assignment provisions of the Patents Act R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
See e.g., Planet Earth Productions Inc. v. Rowlands (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 715, 73
O.R. (2d) 505 (H.C.J.) [Planet Earth].

25

26

Stewart, supra note 12.

27

Re Dickens, [1935] Ch. 267 (C.A.).

Planet Earth, supra note 25, holding copyright to be personal property under
Ontario’s Execution Act; criticized in Vaver, “Can Intellectual Property be Taken to
Satisfy a Judgment Debt?” (1991), 6 Banking & Finance L.Rev. 255.

28
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themselves and lower courts. The Estey dictum keeps cropping up in
various guises in later Court decisions: for example, in such statements
as that “the rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act are
exhaustive”.29 Such statements are potentially mischievous.
For example, some intellectual property statutes—e.g., the

Copyright Act—require assignments of the right to be in writing;
otherwise they say the transaction is of no effect. Some lower courts,
relying on the Estey dictum, take those provisions quite literally. No
effect means no effect; an oral assignee or exclusive licensee is a legal
non-entity: he gets no right at all.30 But suppose I pay $1m on a
handshake for a copyright and spend another $1m developing and
marketing it. Is it really possible that the seller can pocket the $1m
and say I have nothing at all—except a right to a refund, and maybe
not even that—simply because we only shook hands and didn’t think
to have the seller scribble down and sign the magic words: “I hereby
assign you all my copyright in X”? Have we not progressed beyond
the “primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign, and every slip was fatal”?31 Commonwealth courts,
including civilian jurisdictions such as Scotland, have long said that
the intellectual property statutes deal only with legal rights and
remedies; equity steps in where legal rules fail to go.32 An oral
assignment for value does create rights: the assignee can go to court to
get his title formalized by asking for an order compelling the seller to
See e.g., Canadian Assn of Internet Providers v. SOCAN, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 427 at para. 85, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Internet Providers].

29

30

Jeffrey Rogers Knitwear Productions Ltd v. R.D. International Style Collections Ltd

(1986), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 217 (Fed. T.D.) [Jeffrey Rogers]; Masterfile Corp. v. World
Internett Corp. (2001), 16 C.P.R. (4th) 139 (Fed. T.D.) [Masterfile].
31

Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 at 91 (C.A. 1917), Cardozo C.J., (on implying

terms in contracts).

Performing Right Society Ltd v. London Theatre of Varieties Ltd, [1924] A.C. 1
(H.L.), the principle of which has been often applied in the Commonwealth outside
Canada: see, e.g., Lakeview Computers plc v. Steadman, 1999 WL 1048310 (C.A.);
Griggs Group Ltd v. Evans, [2004] F.S.R. 673 (Ch.), aff’d [2005] EWCA 11 [Griggs];
Comprop Ltd v. Moran, [2002] Jersey L.R. 222 at paras. 31-33 & 38 (Royal Ct.);
Sheldon v. Metrokane, [2004] FCA 19 at paras. 47 & 55 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Tayplan Ltd
v. D & A Contracts, [2005] ScotCS CSOH 17, para. 7 (“If I assign a thing which is not
mine, I assign all the rights I have to make it mine. ... The law implies that a cedent
confers on his assignee everything which is necessary to make the assignation
effectual”); cf. the inconclusive discussion in Downing v. General Synod of the
Church of England in Canada, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 553, O.R. 652 (C.A.).
32
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sign a transfer; in default, a court official can sign in the seller’s
place.33 Even before then, oral assignees have got interlocutory
injunctions against infringers, but no final injunction without first
getting a signed assignment or joining the assignor. Despite some
favourable dicta in the Supreme Court,34 I do not know that any lower
federal court has clearly recognized such equitable rights in an
intellectual property case, and a number of decisions oppose the
idea.35 I do not know if the argument for such rights was plainly put to
the court. What is clear is that Supreme Court statements to the
effect that the language of the intellectual property statute is the
beginning and end of rights and obligations under it wrongly dissuade
counsel from making such arguments, and lower courts from
accepting them.

II
How do the decisions before the 1990s compare with those of
the last decade or so? In this last period, the Supreme Court has made
its mark on intellectual property law probably more firmly and
extensively than in any other comparable period in its history. The
Court is plainly convinced of intellectual property’s importance to the
economy. It has demonstrated its willingness to discuss the policy
behind the intellectual property regimes and to reach decisions which
further that policy as it sees it. Few will complain of the brevity of
the judgments. Bottom-liners who cheered the judgments of the early
1990s, which disposed of a case in three sentences (Iacobucci J. for the
Seanix Technology Inc. v. Ircha (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 443 (B.C.S.C.); Csak v.
Aumon (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 567 at 570 (Ont. H.C.J.); Peck v. Powell , [1885] 11

33

S.C.R. 494.
In Webb & Knapp, supra note 5, Abbott J. in his dissent (Ritchie J. concurring)
recognized that an unwritten intention to transfer copyright constituted an equitable
assignment; the majority (by Hall J.) did not disapprove, holding only that the parties
lacked this intention. The Supreme Court has elsewhere accepted that the beneficial
owner of a right is its owner “in reality” even though, until a writing is signed, the
right is formally held in the assignor’s name: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 795 at para. 4. See also Bau- und Forschungsgesellschaft Thermoform AG v.
Chang (1991), 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 90, 37 C.P.R. (3d) 349 (C.A.), enforcing equitable
interest in patent; Teledyne Industries Inc. v. Lido Industrial Products Ltd (1982), 68
C.P.R. (2d) 204, 227 (Fed. T.D.), holding that the federal court may exercise all the
powers of a court of equity.
34

35

Jeffrey Rogers, supra note 30; Masterfile, supra note 30.
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Court) or three pages (Cory J. for the Court),36 have nothing to cheer
about in the lengthy prose that typifies the Court’s current forays into
intellectual property.
What questions has the Court considered? There are of course
issues that recur in one guise or another ever since intellectual
property laws started being written centuries ago. There are
boundary disputes between rights: for example, can the same feature
attract more than one intellectual property right—say a patent and a
trade-mark—so that if one right expires or falls short, another can
take its place?37 Pharmaceutical companies keep their never-ending
war going with generic companies over their attempts to market
arguably off-patent drugs.38 Collecting societies for music publishers
and composers keep probing for new sources of revenue (now the
internet) and have tried to enlist the Supreme Court’s help.39
But new vistas have opened up. The Court has faced
important threshold questions: Can new genetic technologies be
patented as inventions? (Yes, if you’re patenting just the new gene;
no, if you’re patenting the plant or animal containing the modified
gene. Unsurprisingly, both decisions were hotly disputed, with
different narrow majorities swinging the case.40) Who is an inventor
and how much need he know when claiming more widely than his
actual experiments? (Answer: whoever thought up the inventive idea,

Boutin v. Distributions C.L.B. Inc., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 7 (Iacobucci J.); Apple Computer
Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 95 (Cory J.).
See also Kyriacopoulos v. Bouchet (1966), 33 Fox Pat. C. 119 (S.C.C.).

36

37

Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., 2005 SCC 65, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 259 D.L.R.

(4th) 577 [Kirkbi].

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Merck
Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), [1998] 2
S.C.R. 193, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 47; Bristol -Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 1; AstraZeneca Canada
Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2006 SCC 49, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 272 D.L.R. (4th)

38

577.
39

Internet Providers, supra note 29.

40 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45, 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Harvard] (mouse unpatentable); Monsanto Inc. v. Schmeiser,
2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 239 D.L.R. (4th) 271 [Monsanto] (plant gene
patentable).
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and she can then claim as far as sound prediction takes her.41) How
elaborate need a work be to qualify for copyright as original? (Not
very. How about a catchline?42) Can an article, say a Lego block, be
protected as a trade-mark once its patent and design rights have
expired? (No, once you’ve eaten your kilo of cake, it’s gone for
ever.43)
The Court has dealt with issues of responsibility for copyright
infringements,44 and pre- and post-trial remedies for infringement
generally and for the unauthorized taking and using of confidential
information.45 It has taken up ownership issues: can arbitrators decide
intellectual property ownership questions. (Yes, why not?46) Do
freelance journalists retain copyright over their work when their
newspaper digitizes it? (Yes, for on-line transfer and archives; no,
where the work is put on CD-ROM.47)
The Court has decided equally important questions of scope:
how widely could a patent be read to catch technology that didn’t
quite correspond 1:1 with the words of the claims? (Answer: not too
widely.48) How far could trade-marks reach beyond the products on
which they were actually used? (Answer: Not as far as trade-mark
owners would have liked. Veuve Clicquot could not stop a women’s
clothing store in Montreal calling itself Cliquot. However bubbly the
sales assistants, neither they, their products nor their store could be

41

Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, 219

D.L.R. (4th) 660.
42

CCH, supra note 1.

43

Kirkbi, supra note 37.

44

CCH, supra note 1; Internet Providers, supra note 29.

45 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577
(compensation); Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 189, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (requirements for Anton Piller orders);
Monsanto, supra note 40 (account).
46

Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) Inc., 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 178, 223

D.L.R. (4th) 407.

Robertson v. Thompson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363, 274 D.L.R. (4th)
138, a 4:5 dissent that would have let the newspapers have rights over all digitized
content.

47

Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., 2000 SCC 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 194
D.L.R. (4th) 232; Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., 2000 SCC 67, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067,
194 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
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confused with the products or business of the French champagne
house, nor could they affect its image.49 Mattel also couldn’t force a
bar-and-grill chain to stop calling itself “Barbie’s”; Barbie dolls’ fame
didn’t quite reach as far as barbecue pits.50)
Perhaps most interestingly, the Court emphatically rejected
the idea long peddled by intellectual property holders worldwide that
their rights should be construed expansively, while users are left with
nothing but a prayer and a few grudging statutory exceptions. In a
copyright case involving photocopy access to the resources of the Law
Society of Upper Canada’s Great Library, the Court made it clear that
users had rights too, rights that should get the same sort of benevolent
interpretation as was extended to the rights granted to right holders.51
What the Court said was true for copyright must be equally true for
other intellectual property rights.52
Binnie J. has led the Court in many of the decisions, but other
judges have also taken star turns or cameo roles. Intellectual property
cases are no longer the hot potato that is passed round and round until
it is finally picked up by some reluctant player to whom the Chief
Justice has helpfully supplied heat-resistant mitts.

III
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into intellectual
property has been its decision on July 26, 2007 in Euro-Excellence
Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc.53 The scenario was this: a manufacturer
wants to distribute its products worldwide only through distributors
49

Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R.

824, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
50 Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, 268 D.L.R.
(4th) 424. Perhaps, in hindsight, Barbie’s image might have been better protected if
more money had been spent on ensuring that she wasn’t actually hazardous to the
health of her loyal following, rather than on Mattel’s worrying about fancied hazards
to her image from non-competing eateries.
51

CCH, supra note 1.

So argued for patents in D. Vaver & S. Basheer, “Popping Patented Pills: Europe and
a Decade’s Dose of TRIPs” [2006] 28 E.I.P.R. 282.

52

53 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 282 D.L.R. (4th) 353 [Kraft]. Coincidentally, the case had
particular contemporary interest at the time this lecture was given, in the light of the
excitement around the strong Canadian dollar and the varied effect it was then having
on availability and prices relative to the United States.
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he authorizes. Unauthorized distributors are to be excluded. The
problem is that the product is a perfectly ordinary consumable: here,
branded chocolate.
The manufacturer, actually two European
affiliates of the giant US food producer Kraft Foods Inc., wanted to
stop parallel imports of Toblerone and another brand of chocolate
from Europe into Canada. The imports were genuine and carried
their original packaging and trade-marks, so trade-mark or passing-off
law could not prop up Kraft’s scheme: no consumer was fooled into
buying something different from what he expected.54 The Canadian
importer was committing no tort or breach of contract. The
chocolates were unpatented. So Kraft turned to copyright.
It did not claim, as it might successfully have done in Canada
in the early 1980s, that the chocolates themselves were protected by
copyright.55 Instead, Kraft Europe claimed copyright in the logos –
the trade-marks with their design features – that appeared on the
chocolate wrappers. It gave its Canadian counterpart, Kraft Canada,
an exclusive licence in the copyright in Canada for a nominal annual
sum, and then joined in the copyright infringement suit that its
subsidiary brought against the importer.
This was no original scheme. Pigeon J. had flagged a similar
possibility in 1974.56 A decade later, the makers of Bailey’s Irish
Smith & Nephew Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc. (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d) 153 (Fed. C.A.) (no
trade-mark infringement); Consumer’s Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 583, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (no passing-off). Assigning or licensing the
Canadian trade-mark rights risked invalidating the marks as non-distinctive because
consumers might not know whether the Europeans or the Canadians stood behind
the product: Breck’s, supra note 11.

54

In those heady days, ordinary products were sometimes protected by saying that
copying them was a breach of artistic copyright and to copy the product was
indirectly to copy the artistic manufacturing drawings that revealed the product
shape, whether or not the second comer had ever seen the drawings. See Spiro-Flex
Industries Ltd v. Progressive Sealing Inc. (1986), 7 B.C.L.R. (2d) 189, 32 D.L.R. (4th)
201 (S.C.) (copyright in drawings for pump prevented others from copying the pump).
Parliament closed off this strategy by an amendment (now s. 64) to the Copyright Act
in 1988: see D. Vaver, “The Canadian Copyright Amendments of 1988” (1988) 4 I.P.J.
121.
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Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Canada [1975] 2. S.C.R. 236, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 399 [Trudel].
“Can a manufacturer make use of copyright on the directions for use of his product so
as to subject its sale to all the rights provided in the Copyright Act...?” Answer in
Australia, pre-1998: yes (Pioneer Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v. Lee, [2000] FCA
1926 (Aust. Fed. Ct.) (DVD players).
56
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Cream used copyright in labels to stop parallel imports into Australia,
and TDK then successfully tried the same ploy in South Africa with
parallel imports of its audio tapes.57 The scheme did not always work.
It failed in the European Union, where Dior relied on both trademark law and copyright in its logo to try to prevent a discount drug
store from advertising and selling Dior products. The European Court
of Justice said trade-mark law could not stop somebody from honestly
advertising genuine goods; and copyright law should not go where
trade-mark law feared to tread.58 The Australians changed their
statute in 1998 to stop what they saw as an abuse of copyright law.59
Canadian policy makers have thus long been aware of the problem,
but have chosen to neglect it.
An ingenuous observer might of course ask two pertinent
questions of the Canadian case. First, had not Kraft already profited
from its sale to the European source from which the Canadian
importer had bought? What business had it then in impairing a
resale? Some states recognize that logic by saying a first sale exhausts
whatever copyrights a work had till then. The intellectual property
owner loses all downstream control over resales. As we shall see,
Canada recognizes that rule only weakly: just where the copyright
owner is identical in both the exporting and importing country.
The ingenuous observer might then ask her second question:
was not the Kraft group really behind the whole case? Why should we
pretend that the puppetry between the Kraft subsidiaries with the
licence agreement made any difference? The short answer is: where
would corporate law or corporate lawyers be if paper arrangements
among parents and subsidiaries were not given legal effect? We have
long become enured to Holmes J.’s bon mot that “The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.” He might have said with

R. & A. Bailey Co. v. Boccaccio Pty Ltd (1986), 84 F.L.R. 232 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Frank
& Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v. A. Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd (1993), 29 I.P.R. 465 (App.

57

Div. S.A.).

Parfums Christian Dior SA v Evora BV, [1997] E.C.R. I-6013 at para. 58: “the
protection conferred by copyright as regards the reproduction of protected works in a
reseller's advertising may not, in any event, be broader than that which is conferred
on a trade mark owner in the same circumstances”.

58

Copyright Act 1968, s. 10(1), as am. 1998, c. C-42 referred to in Kraft, supra note 53
at para. 5, Rothstein J.
59
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equal truth: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
fiction.”
The lower courts followed this revised dictum to find that
Kraft Canada, a different copyright holder from Kraft Europe, could
enforce its right to stop parallel imports. The federal court of appeal
affirmed a judgment awarding Kraft a large sum of damages and an
injunction to have the importer blank out the trade-marks when
selling chocolates.60 By a 7-2 majority, the Supreme Court reversed
this judgment – but what an odd majority, and what an odd reversal.
Had the Court sat two years earlier with its then different
composition of judges, or as a panel of five or seven, the result could
easily have been different. Which recalls Milton’s lines from Paradise
Lost:
“...Chaos Umpire sits,
And by decision more imbroiles the fray
By which he Reigns: next him high Arbiter
Chance governs all...”61

Or, less stirringly, Tom Brown’s satirical rhyme about Dean
John Fell of Christ Church, Oxford, in the 17th century:
I do not love thee, Doctor Fell,
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this alone I know full well,
I do not love thee, Doctor Fell.

A clear majority of the Court seemed unhappy with the lower
courts’ result, but could not agree on the source of their unhappiness.
The only common point of agreement was that a parallel importer
need not fear an infringement suit based on copyright in trade-marks
or product packaging, where the entity which owns the copyright in
both Canada and the country of export is the same. Beyond that,
matters disintegrate.

60

Kraft Canada Inc.v. Euro-Excellence Inc., [2004] 4 F.C.R. 410, mod. & aff’d [2006] 3

F.C.R. 91 (C.A.).
61

Book 2, ll. 907-10.
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The precise question before the court involved an oddly
drafted provision on importing, subsection 27(2) of the Copyright Act,
the antecedents of which can be traced back to the copyright laws of
Victorian Britain. The subsection provides that importing for sale or
distribution is infringement if the importer knew or should have
known the work would infringe copyright “if it had been made in
Canada by the person who made it”.62 Philosophers might well ask
how one can have actual, let alone constructive knowledge, of a
hypothetical set of facts. This point is rather serious since a form of
subsection 27(2), omitting constructive knowledge, appears in the
criminal enforcement provisions of the Act: deliberate parallel
importing seems to be a crime as well as a civil wrong, and attracts on
indictment a maximum million dollar fine and 5 years’ jail.63
The question which divided the Supreme Court was this:
could Kraft Canada (the licensee) hypothetically have sued Kraft
Europe (the person who had the logo made) for infringement of the
Canadian copyright?
If so, the importer infringed Canadian
copyright, because Kraft Europe hypothetically infringed.
If one sets aside whether or not this convoluted means of
imposing civil liability is good policy, the issue is whether or not the
statutory hypothesis can be made to work satisfactorily. It seems best
geared to a case where the Canadian and foreign company are at
arms’-length, so that the permissible partitioning of territory by
copyright is the result of an arms’-length deal. The foreign company’s
profits from its foreign copyrights would then be its alone; the profits
the Canadian company makes or expects would also be its own and
would come from exploiting the Canadian copyrights it bought.
But in Kraft the two companies were not at arms’-length.
They were controlled by the parent, Kraft US. Must this fact be
ignored? I suggest not. On the hypothesis the Copyright Act
requires, Kraft Europe would never have infringed Kraft Canada’s
copyright had Kraft Europe produced trade-marked chocolate
wrappings in Canada, for this act would have been ultimately
authorized by the companies’ US parent. Kraft US would never have
allowed Kraft Canada to sue Kraft Europe to the group’s ultimate
62 Importing for private consumption is not caught; cross-border shoppers may shop
with clear conscience.
63

Copyright Act, s.42(1)(g), supra note 22.
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detriment. If the theoretical distinction between the commission of a
wrong and the decision whether or not to sue for it must be
maintained, then one may say that Kraft Canada would inevitably
have consented to Kraft Europe’s activities. Consent precludes
infringement; the claimant who does not plead and prove his lack of
consent to the defendant’s act omits an essential element of copyright
infringement and should have his case dismissed.64 Thus, no
infringement of Kraft Canada’s rights could have occurred, whether
Kraft Canada was Kraft Europe’s assignee or exclusive licensee.
This reasoning accepts the artificial reality of the two
companies as separate entities, but realistically treats them as
members of the same family who would never serve the Queen’s writ
upon the other. The argument does not require a fictitious intent to
be implied; it infers an intent that must have existed in reality. For
what is tortious between arms’-length corporations need not be so
between affiliates. This reasoning also preserves the value of
Canadian copyrights as assets that may be genuinely dealt with
between arms’-length parties.65
Had the Court adopted this line of reasoning, the Kraft
plaintiffs would have lost their case on grounds that were both
commercially satisfying and also juridically respectable. None of the
nine judges, however, considered this argument. Perhaps the point
was not made this way to them. Perhaps they may have wanted
evidence of Kraft’s corporate set-up, although judicial notice might
easily have been taken of it. Instead, the Court divided into four
blocs, with mixed concurrences and dissents:
1. In what are labelled the Court’s “Reasons for Judgment”,
three judges led by Rothstein J. said that Kraft Canada could not sue
Kraft Europe: an exclusive licensee can sue everyone for infringement,
except the copyright owner. No owner can be sued for infringing his
own copyright. Had Kraft Europe transferred copyright ownership to
Kraft Canada, the importer would have lost.
2. Three judges led by Bastarache J. said Rothstein J. was
wrong: the exclusive licensee had by statute an interest in copyright,
Avel Pty Ltd v. Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990),171 C.L.R. 88 (Aust. H.C.);
R. v. Laurier Office Mart Inc. (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 403 (Ont. Prov. Div.), aff’d (1995),
64

63 C.P.R. (3d) 229 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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A concern of Rothstein J’s in Kraft, supra note 53 at para. 21.
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which meant he could sue the copyright owner. But, said Bastarache
J., he could sue him only for importing to sell the work, not to sell
something like a trade-mark or packaging that is just incidental to the
work. To paraphrase: if you sell a cat, unless it’s a Manx, the tail
comes with it; you don’t say you’re selling a cat and a tail.
3. Two judges, Abella J. with McLachlin C.J.C. concurring,
said Bastarache J. was right about the exclusive licence but wrong on
his cat-and-tail argument. They agreed on this point with Rothstein
J., who also rejected Bastarache J.’s tail-with-cat argument: when do
you know a tail is incidental to the cat? Some cats might fall over
without it, or would be laughed out of a cat show.
4. Just to thicken this bouillabaisse, Fish J. concurred in
Rothstein J.’s reasons for judgment but added his “grave doubt
whether the law governing the protecting of intellectual property
rights in Canada can be transformed in this way into an instrument of
trade control not contemplated by the Copyright Act.”66
So we find different majorities for and against different
propositions. If we assume the importer has the requisite actual or
constructive knowledge, parallel imports are allowed or not in the
following cases:
(a) If there is copyright in the product (say a sound recording)
and an assignment of the Canadian copyright, parallel import for
resale or rental is not allowed. (The whole Court would agree with
that, possibly even Fish J.)
(b) Importing is also not allowed if there is a grant of an
exclusive Canadian licence in the copyright. (At least five of the nine
judges would agree with this: the Bastarache and Abella blocs.)
(c) If the copyright is in the trade-mark or packaging and
there is an assignment of Canadian copyright, then the product cannot
be imported without prior deletion of the copyright material. (A
majority of five would agree with this: the Rothstein and Abella blocs.
Fish J. might not join them.)
(d) The product can be imported in that case if there is just a
grant of a Canadian exclusive licence, but we do not know
conclusively why. Four of the judges say: because the exclusive
licence makes all the difference. Three say: because the trade-mark or
66

Ibid. at para. 56.
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packaging is just incidental. And each group vehemently dissents
with the other’s view.

IV
What does Kraft suggest about intellectual property today?
And why should anyone other than intellectual property lawyers and
policy-makers care?
First, whoever is interested in the Rule of Law should care: if
the statutory provisions at issue in Kraft are typical – and I fear they
are – then our intellectual property laws are not well drafted and need
to be urgently improved. If our top judges cannot agree on them,
what hope is there for legal advisers or ordinary users of the system?
Secondly, whoever is interested in competition and consumer
law should care: for Kraft suggests that copyright protects too much
too easily. The law can be easily manipulated to stifle competition.
Copyright has moved away from its core function of protecting
cultural products into the realm of ordinary industry and commerce.
The logo might technically qualify as an original art, although bits
were excluded as unoriginal by the trial judge following the Supreme
Court’s tightening up of originality criteria in the Osgoode Great
Library case.67 We might accept that copyright usefully protects the
original artist’s interest in initially being able to market her work,
although in practice she usually loses all rights in it by contract to the
firm that employed her as employee or consultant.68 But once the
logo is used as a trade-mark and the artist has no further legal interest
in it, the laws relating to commerce (trade-mark law), not culture,
should govern its protection, and copyright should drop out of the
picture.
Thirdly, economists and international trade lawyers should
care: for, as Kraft indicates, copyright law in fact is less about
protecting culture than about protecting businesses from competition.
Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc. 2004 FC 652, [2004] F.C.R. 410 at paras.
31-37 (Fed. Ct.), following CCH, supra note 1. The findings on originality were
unchallenged on appeal.
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Griggs, supra note 32, where, even with no express term on copyright ownership,
the company making “Doc Martens” shoes was held to be the equitable owner of
copyright in the trade-mark design it had commissioned from an advertising agency,
which in turn had used a freelance designer to author the work.
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Most of intellectual property law is designed to achieve that end. The
protection is to encourage invention and cultural production, but we
never know how much protection is necessary or desirable. In
principle, we should not protect more than is necessary to produce
the conduct we want. Any more just imposes social costs and diverts
resources away from other sectors of the economy.
In that light, the question of how far copyright should ban
parallel importing should be revisited. We have free trade agreements
galore; yet when intellectual property is involved, we suddenly find
that copyright acts as a restriction on competition and goods cannot
cross borders freely at all. What intellectual property laws cannot
achieve is now often achieved technologically: so-called technological
protection and digital management measures are used to impose
restrictions on who can use what and where.69 These points need
revisiting not just for copyright-protected products, but for
intellectual property products generally.
Movement might no doubt be restricted in particular sectors
for good reason. Book distributors played the Canadian culture card
to get protection in 1997 under the copyright law amendments for
their local distribution systems. Hair dye makers defended, on safety
grounds, a dual distribution system that allowed sales of unlabelled
products only to professionals and of labelled products only to
consumers.70 But what may go for books or hazardous goods hardly
goes for European chocolate bars or other ordinary consumer
products. In the European Union and European Free Trade Area, the
idea of a common market has meant that intellectual property laws
cannot prevent goods from moving around freely within Europe,
although imports from outside Europe can be stopped. As one text
puts it:
...[P]arallel (or gray) importation, i.e., buying in a low-cost
country and selling in a high-cost country, is likely to occur
(and indeed in many ways is encouraged) and that practice
may act, within the Community itself, as an adjustment
mechanism driving towards price uniformity. The activities

D. Vaver, “Copyright and the internet: from owner rights and user duties to user
rights and owner duties?” (2007) 57:3 Case Western L.Rev. 000 (in press).
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Trudel, supra note 56, decided on Quebec civil law, expressly without reference to
competition law principles.
70
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of the parallel importer are thus of singular importance to
achievement of the Single Market and have been supported,
wherever possible, by Community institutions – not least by
the Court of Justice.71

European negotiators use free entry into European markets as
a bargaining chip when negotiating bilateral trade agreements. What
has always been extraordinary about the NAFTA as a free trade
agreement is its silence on the question of free movement of
intellectual property-protected goods within the NAFTA area, or their
entry from outside the area while their intellectual property is
ultimately controlled by a NAFTA-based entity such as Kraft Foods
Inc.
Fourthly, economists may also care about the question
whether multiple intellectual property rights in any work are
desirable or not. Intellectual property legislation sometimes deals
with overlaps, but only erratically. In principle, multiple rights seem
unnecessary. If intellectual property rights are a carrot to encourage
conduct, when do we need to dangle two carrots to encourage a single
activity? Would we have fewer or worse trade-marks if they lacked
copyright protection? I doubt it. The need for effective marketing is
spur enough to create effective trade-marks.
Of course, every producer or right holder would like double
protection. Many pilots prefer twin-engine to single-engine craft, just
as firms and their advisers like back-up just in case one form of
protection fails. But that reasoning hardly applies here. Trade-marks
retain common law protection even after they get registered under
the Trade-marks Act; to confer copyright on them as well is to protect
thrice over. Only legal neurotics or carrot gluttons need that.
Lastly, free speech lawyers should care: for although copyright
is often touted as a means to protect and encourage free speech,72 it
often works to restrict speech, and particularly so where copyright in
trade-marks is recognized. Buying chocolate bars seems distant from
W. Cornish and D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade
Marks and Allied Rights, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 737.
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free speech issues, but consider this instance from a decade ago: the
Michelin tyre company successfully sued a trade union that had used
a caricature of its registered mark of a roly-poly cartoon figure in
leaflets designed to persuade workers in Michelin’s Nova Scotia plants
to join the union. The case failed in passing-off and trade-mark
infringement because the court decided that the union was not using
the mark in trade on any goods or for any services. But the union was
found liable for infringing copyright in the trade-mark. There was no
defence under the Copyright Act—parody is not a specific head of fair
dealing in Canada73—nor did the Charter claim of freedom of
expression succeed: in a struggle between that right and copyright as
“property” (Estey J. notwithstanding74), copyright triumphed.75
I do not know if that first instance decision can stand in the
light of later Supreme Court jurisprudence. In a comparable later case
in South Africa, the Constitutional Court preferred free speech over
trade-mark rights where a critic of a brewery company’s hiring
practices put the brewer’s trade-mark on a T-shirt with some critical
comment.76 One hopes that current Canadian courts would be no less
protective of free speech.77 But so far lower courts continue to tread
Copyright Act ss. 27(1)(a) & (a.1), supra note 22. The Michelin court (Compagnie
Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile,
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW- Canada),
[1997] 2 F.C. 306, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (T.D.) [Michelin] rejected the view that parody
was impliedly “criticism”, a statutory head of fair dealing; sed quaere.
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eds., Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Oxford
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See e.g., R. v. Guignard, 2002 SCC 14, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, where LeBel J. for the
Court invalidated, on Charter free expression grounds, a municipal bylaw that
outlawed the erection or display of signs which included any trade name, if the
municipality had not first approved them. An aggrieved customer of an insurance
company was thus free to maintain a sign on his property that “named and shamed”
the company for allegedly delaying payment of a claim. LeBel J. said municipalities
could not take away citizens’ rights to air grievances cheaply and effectively, adding
that “simple means of expression such as posting signs or distributing pamphlets or
leaflets or, these days, posting messages on the Internet are the optimum means of
communication for discontented consumers” (ibid., para. 25). See also Musical
Fidelity Ltd v. Vickers, [2003] F.S.R. 898, 907 (C.A.), where it was suggested that
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the Michelin line. Around the same time as Kraft was being decided,
a Quebec court banned, on copyright grounds, a trade union from
reproducing on its placards the masthead of the newspaper against
which the workers were striking. Again, the court swept aside the
union’s Charter arguments: strikers had no greater privilege than any
other citizen to use others’ “property.”78

V
What characterizes the Supreme Court’s recent decisions as a
whole?
First, the judges are more informed about and interested in
intellectual property issues than ever before. They often resort to a
metaphor of balance: weighing the need to give an intellectual
property holder fair protection as an incentive to create or acquire the
intellectual property in the first place, against the needs of
competitors and the public to have fair access to ideas and products.
Secondly, prior to the 1990s, intellectual property decisions
rarely created much dissent. The single concurred-in judgment was
the norm.79 Today, the Court seems more divided in intellectual
property cases. Dissents and concurrences are quite common. Perhaps
this is true of other cases too. In intellectual property law, the reason
is sometimes the inherently controversial nature of the dispute,
coupled with opaque law. For example, the patenting of higher life

freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950
(art.10) might allow the posting on a website of a copyright-protected letter to
criticize its contents and sender.

Corporation Sun Media c. Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique, 2007 QCCS
2943, para. 32: “Le tribunal ne peut se convaincre que le seul fait d’être en conflit de
travail permet à un tiers d’utiliser la propriété d’un autre et ce n’est pas brimer la
liberté d’expression, mais c’est une juste limite à cette liberté d’expression.” [“The
court is unconvinced that the mere fact of a labour conflict allows a third party to use
another’s property. This does not infringe freedom of expression, but is a just limit on
such freedom.” (My translation - DV)]
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forms is inherently controversial; add the need to interpret a
provision defining an invention in language dating back to an early
19th century American law, and dissent is not unlikely.80 Sometimes
the common and civil lawyers on the court fall out over doctrinal
differences.81 Sometimes the metaphor of balance produces different
emphases and different conclusions: it is easy to calibrate weights and
scales differently.
Thirdly, the court’s methodology today has moved on from
that of a couple of decades ago. The judges all clearly recognize the
international nature of intellectual property and are receptive to
comparative and policy arguments. They of course pay close attention
to the language of the legislation, but are willing to interpret it in the
light of experience abroad.
Yet sometimes, with the best will in the world, the
interpretation problems are intractable. The legislation is just not
clear enough. We saw it in the arguments in the Harvard Mouse case82
about whether or not a genetically modified animal is an invention.
The Kraft case is the most recent striking example of the lack of
clarity of legislation, the drafting of which traces back into the 19th
century. Both Rothstein and Bastarache JJ. claimed to interpret the
statute purposively but each saw different purposes in it and each
claimed the other was reading in words that were not in the Act.
In one of his papers, Learned Hand offered some useful advice
on statutory interpretation, advice partly born of his experience in
writing many excellent intellectual property judgments over his life as
a judge of the US district court and later the US court of appeals for
the Second Circuit:
The judge must ... find out the will of the government from
words which are chosen from common speech and which
had better not attempt to provide for every possible
contingency. How does he in fact proceed? Although at
times he says and believes that he is not doing so, what he
80
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really does is to take the language before him ... and try to
find out what the government ... would have done, if the
case before him had been before them. He calls this finding
the intent of the statute. ... This is often not really true. The
men who used the language did not have any intent at all
about the case that has come up; it had not occurred to their
minds. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to know what they
would have said about it, if it had. ...
The judge must always remember that he should go no
further than he is sure the government would have gone,
had it been faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt,
he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests
in the society for which he speaks would have come to a
just result, even though he is sure that he knows what the
just result would be. He is not to substitute his juster will
for theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will
which prevails, and to that extent the people would not
govern. 83

The problem with intellectual property laws, as Kraft
recognizes, is that one cannot be sure from the language where the
government is coming from, let alone where it is going. Judges grope
for what signs they can find to discern on an undedicated path. This
is no longer good enough, if it ever was. How many cases like Kraft
have to occur for the government to recognize that it needs to
modernize the whole intellectual property law and produce a system
that actually makes things simpler for creators and innovators, and the
firms that employ and bankroll them and distribute their products?
I have long argued that Canada needs to modernize its
intellectual property laws.84 The field is particularly untidy. The
great codifications of the 19th century in the law of sale of goods, bills
of exchange and crime were successful in systemizing and clarifying
the law, as well as exposing shortfalls and setting the scene for
periodic reform. Codification of all intellectual property rights into a
“How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?” in I. Dillard, ed., The Spirit of
Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
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single unified code would have the same effect. It would remove
fragmentation, deal comprehensively with common issues, more
precisely delineate boundaries between rights, minimize discrepancies
and overlaps, and generally reduce transaction costs.
The provisions on transfer and licensing of intellectual
property rights, as well as defences to and remedies for infringement,
could be standardized. Now there are wide differences for no reason
other than the provisions were drafted at different times by different
hands. In Kraft, some of the judges seemed to think there is hardly
any difference between an assignment and an exclusive licence. If that
is true (and I am with Rothstein J. in thinking that it is not so in
Canada),85 then we should make that explicit.
We need a single national registry of intellectual property
rights to be established, allowing electronic filing and cross-searching.
This could serve as a model that would develop into a regional and
worldwide network of registries and would facilitate transparent
ownership and transfer.
There will, of course, be difficulties. Change in intellectual
property law is always a fractious affair. In the early 1950s Canada
reformed its trade-mark law by appointing a committee headed by Dr.
Harold Fox Q.C. to draft a new law.86 The committee did that; the
law was quickly enacted; and most acknowledge that it has done
serviceable duty for a half-century. Even so, that law needs updating
given advances in technology and theoretical understanding since; but
at least the statute is internally coherent, being based on a coherent
vision. Is there not a good case for a committee like that to undertake
reform and modernization of the whole intellectual property system
today?
Not only do we need clearer and fairer laws; we need simpler
laws that are easier to read and understand. Successive governments
have not really been serious about keeping intellectual property law
under continuing review in this or other respects. They have gone
through the motions but the net result is that treaties are duly
implemented and a Copyright Board has been established, but little
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else of substance has occurred. This failure of legislative policy and
national vision costs the economy dearly.
Consider what Dickson J. said a quarter century ago about the
provision in the Patent Act which requires the inventor properly to
disclose his invention. This section (then s. 36), he said, was “at the
heart of the patent system”. Here is how it looked to him on a legal
cardiogram:
It cannot be said that s. 36 of the Act is happily phrased. It
gives the impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at
random rather than an attempt to enunciate, clearly and
concisely, a governing principle or principles. This is
perhaps understandable in that the section is the product of
amendment over a period of many years. The language
simply does not lend itself to a tight, literal interpretation.
It is, and should be treated as, a parliamentary
pronouncement, in general terms....87

And he then proceeded to trace the history of the language
that appeared in s. 36 from Canada’s 1869 patent law derived from an
1836 US statute. The US provision has since been changed, but the
only reform the Canadian provision has undergone is that it has been
renumbered.88
Other criticisms of the drafting of the intellectual property
statutes litter the books. Dickson C.J.C.’s remarks typify how much of
Canada’s intellectual property law looks today. These laws were often
badly written when they were first enacted; successive amendments
have been better, but not much. The laws have never been drafted –
as they should be – so as to be understood by the users of the system:
authors, inventors, designers, entrepreneurs, and their backers. Like
old cars, the statutes have had bits tacked on here and papered over
there. But these are not vintage cars worth hanging on to. At some
stage they need to be traded in or junked. I think that time is fast
approaching, if it is not already here.
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